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Farmer Participation in Reforestation Incentive Programs in Costa Rica . 
ABSTRACT
 
Reforestation programs are a common policy response among developing country governments in 
the tropics attempting to deal with environmental and economic problems caused by widespread 
deforestation. The objective of this paper is to examine participation by small- and medium-sized 
farms in two reforestation programs undertaken in recent years by one country, Costa Rica, which 
has been at the forefront of developing country environmental protection efforts. Analysis of a 
survey of 243 program participants and non-participants shows that farm households participating 
in reforestation programs had generally larger farm sizes, were dedicated to low labor-intensive, 
land-extensive agricultural activities, faced significant family on-farm labor constraints, were more 
heavily dependent on off-farm income sources, and had more extensive contact with local extension 
efforts. Logistic regression is employed to econometrically identify demographic, economic, and 
land use determinants of farm household participation in reforestation programs; the implications 
of these findings are analyzed. The limitations of reforestation programs, especially with regard to 
management factors and quality of reforested plots, are reviewed. Implications for improving the 
efficiency of reforestation programs and the merits of other policy alternatives are also discussed. 
Farmer Participation in 
Reforestation Incentive Programs in Costa Rica 
Introduction 
In recent decades, accelerated rates of deforestation have caused growing environmental degradation 
throughout the developing nations of the tropics. The loss of primary forest cover has caused 
widespread soil fertility loss and erosion, watershed deterioration, and destruction of coastal fisheries 
habitats [Leonard, 1987]. As a result, biological diversity has been also been widely threatened 
[Wilcox and Murphy, 1985]. 
Costa Rica, a small country in Central America, has been at the forefront of developing 
country environmental protection efforts [Utting, 1993]. Nonetheless, Costa Rica has experienced 
one of the highest rates of deforestation in the tropics [World Resources Institute, 1994]. Estimates 
of the extent of deforestation range between 30,000 ha/yr to 50,000 ha/yr since 1965, principally 
through forest conversion to expand the agricultural frontier [Segura, 1992]. World Bank estimates 
for 1992 show that clearcutting of primary forest stands had declined to 8,500 ha/yr; however, 
39,500 ha/yr were being converted from pristine forest to some form of mixed use [World Bank, 
1993]. By 1993, only an estimated 320,000 hectares of intact primary forests, or six percent of Costa 
Rica's land area, remained outside of registered protected areas [Batchelder, 1993]. These remaining 
tracts of original forest are expected to largely disappear by the end of the century. 
This loss of forest cover raises several concerns. The potential scarcity of future timber 
resources is the first direct consequence. Declining forest resources are projected to generate $350 
-million in wood product import demands by the beginning of the next century [Segura, 1992]. 
Second is the loss of biodiversity protection which forested lands provide. Third, nearly two-thirds ." 
(65%) of those lands deforested since 1966 are deemed not suitable for uses other than forestry 
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[World Bank, 1993]. Clearing of inappropriate lands has lead to moderate soil erosion on an 
estimated 24% of land area and severe erosion on an additional 17% of land area in Costa Rica 
[Thrupp, 1990], threatening the long-run viability of the country's agriculture, on which Costa Rica 
is still heavily dependent for domestic food production, employment and the generation of export 
earnings. 
Concerns that deforestation will lead to future timber shortages, creating pressure on 
protected natural forests or necessitating timber imports, have led many tropical countries, including 
Costa Rica, to establish incentive programs for reforestation [Godoy, 1992; Utting, 1993]. These 
programs frequently use subsidies to overcome the reluctance of landholders to invest in an activity 
in which returns are realized only over the very long term, and in order to maintain the social benefits 
of forests even when they provide low private returns [Godoy, 1992; Ascher, 1995]. Since the 
reforested areas in Costa Rica are often steep hillsides, one of these broader social benefits of 
reforestation programs is the watershed protection function to which they contribute. 
The Costa Rican government has promoted reforestation by landowners through a series of 
incentive programs having the goals of decreasing pressures to exploit remaining remnant forests 
and providing a productive and regenerative use for degraded landscapes. In 1988 and 1989, 
respectively, the Forestry Bond Certificate in Advance (CAFa) and the Forestry Development Fund 
(PDF) were created to provide reforestation grants to small- and medium-sized farmers organized 
in reforestation associations. These incentive programs have several objectives, including achieving 
a sufficient level of reforested timber production to satisfy national market demand, decreasing soil 
­
erosion, and reducing the degradation of marginal lands [Martinez et aI., 1994]. 
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The success of reforestation incentive programs such as Costa Rica's CAFa and FDF 
programs depends fundamentally on a proper understanding of the motivations underlying farmers' 
decisions whether or not to participate. By targeting incentive programs at those most likely to 
participate and those predisposed to active and responsible participation, program efficiency can be 
improved. This paper reports the results of a comparative analysis of CAFa and FDF program 
reforesters and non-reforesters in the Canton of Coto Brus, Costa Rica. The research seeks to 
analyze farmers' participation in government-sponsored reforestation programs using logistic 
regression analysis to identify a set of economic, social, and land use factors associated with 
participation in these programs. Using these "targeting" criteria, the paper discusses how successful 
incentive programs might better reflect these factors. The underlying hypothesis is that farm system 
attributes and farm household characteristics playa significant role in determining participation in 
and efficiency of reforestation programs. The broad implications of this analysis for reforestation 
programs in general, for multiple output agroforestry systems, and for reforestation programs relative 
to other types of policy interventions are also discussed. 
Reforestation Programs in Costa Rica 
In 1979, the Costa Rican government initiated efforts to actively promote reforestation. These 
efforts included income tax deductions, subsidized credit, municipal forestry tax funds to promote 
the reforestation infrastructure, and bonds to reimburse prior investment [Segura, 1992]. These early 
programs suffered from a number of problems: high investment costs, accessibility primarily by 
-
large, wealthy landholders, and corruption and mismanagement. As a result of these limitations, 
these programs had been discontinued by the early 1990's. 
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In 1988, the Rural Forestry Development Department (DECAFOR) was formed within the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Mining (MIRENEM) to implement the Forestry Bond Certificate 
in Advance (CAFa) and the Forestry Development Fund (FDF). These programs provide grants to 
small-sized (up to 30 hectares) and medium-sized (30-150 hectares) farmers to encourage the 
establishment of reforested plantations. While the earlier programs had benefitted only a small 
segment of the population, the CAFa and FDF programs were aimed at democratizing the 
reforestation incentive programs by offering upfront investment capital to farmers [Segura, 1992]. 
The research detailed here focuses exclusively on the CAFa and FDF programs. 
The CAFa was established in 1988 as a grant of 100,000 colones per hectare but had 
increased by 1994 to 120,000 colones per hectare (approximately US $765 at the average 1994 
exchange rate of 157 colones = 1 US$). Of this amount, 24;000 colones (20% of the total) is 
allocated to the reforestation association and the remaining 96,000 colones is utilized by the farmer. 
The grant is disbursed over the first five years of plantation establishment [Morales, 1992]. The FDF 
was initiated in 1989 with funds from the government of Holland. The FDF is a long-term rotating 
loan system wherein farmers receive 58,000 colones (roughly US $370 in 1994) per hectare, 
distributed over a period of three years [Morales, 1992]. The reforestation association receives an 
additional 14,000 colones per hectare distributed over a five-year period [Martinez et al., 1994]. 
In the Coto Bros area the decision regarding which incentive program a farmer may 
participate in is made not by the individual farmer but by the reforestation association which, in 
­
effect, pools funds from both programs and allocates them to selected farmer participants. The 
farmers interviewed for this analysis perceived the CAFa and FDF as a 'single reforestation incentive 
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program, and thus the program participation decision addressed in this research should be viewed 
accordingly. 
As in other locations, the effort to promote tree planting among farmers through the use of 
economic incentives has met with varied success in Costa Rica [Current, 1995; Howard and Valerio, 
1996]. The rate of participation in reforestation programs is often low and long-term results are 
uncertain. The quality of management and of the reforested plots themselves is typically low. The 
financial burden on the national government necessitates that incentives be efficiently targeted to 
achieve their goals. Doing so depends greatly on accurately understanding the motivations and 
intentions of individual farmers. Limited research has been done to identify the motivations of 
households participating in reforestation programs such as the CAFa and FDF. The comparative 
approach adopted here -- that is, comparing program participants and non-participants -- can more 
clearly discern the factors which motivate farmers to participate in such reforestation programs. 
Results of the research can help in the design of more effective programs in countries electing this 
policy approach. 
Factors Influencing Farmers' Reforestation Efforts 
This analysis of factors affecting reforestation efforts in Costa Rica draws from several distinct areas 
in the literature on agroforestry, forestry, and program participation. For instance, the issue of land 
and tree tenure has been found by many authors [Hyman, 1983a; Skutsch, 1983; Murray, 1985; 
Cernea, 1992; Dewees, 1992; Godoy, 1992] to be a significant constraint to tree cultivation among 
-
small landholders. The current efforts by the World Bank and other agencies to promote private .' 
land-titling throughout the developing world presumes that assuring land and tree tenure rights will 
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significantly enhance the rates of reforestation and agroforestry adoption. This issue is relevant to 
this study since land and tree tenure are required for participants in the CAFa and FDF incentive 
programs. 
Other studies in other developing nations [Dewees, 1992; Murray, 1985; Skutsch, 1983] have 
highlighted a scarcity of fuelwood as one of the necessary factors to motivate reforestation. 
However, Godoy [1992] and Wiersum and Veer [1983] question the simple assumption that high 
fuelwood demand stimulates tree production, suggesting that this is only the case when there is a 
fuelwood scarcity. In the research site for this study, Coto Brus, Costa Rica, fuelwood is the 
principal energy source for household needs. Yet, as a major coffee producing region, fuelwood 
supplies are often obtained from the periodic prunings and thinnings of coffee tree plantations. The 
CAFa and FDF programs are, moreover, restricted to the production of mature timber for 
construction, not for fuelwood resources. 
Within the developing world, there has also been a strong emphasis in promoting communal 
social forestry. There is a substantial literature concerning the social and economic factors which 
influence the success of community forestry projects [Boonkird, Fernandes, and Nair, 1984; Shiva, 
Bandyopadhyay, and Jayal, 1985; Gregersen, Draper, and Elz, 1989; Cernea, 1992]. Studies in 
countries such as India and Haiti have provided evidence that reforestation on individual private 
landholdings can also be successful [Shiva, Bandyopadhyay, and Jayal, 1985; Murray, 1985]. 
Despite the importance of these individual reforestation initiatives, studies of factors influencing 
private reforestation efforts (aside from feasibility studies) are relatively limited. 
-

Motivations for the adoption of agroforestry practices are also discussed in a large literature 
[Arnold, 1987, 1992; Hoskins, 1987; Hosier, 1989~ Caveness and Kurtz, 1993; Current and Scherr, 
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1995]. To a lesser degree, research has also focused on the motivations for commercial timber 
reforestation [Hyman, 1983a, 1983b; FAD, 1988]. These studies have generally indicated that 
multiple-use agroforestry systems which incorporate short-term rotations and produce multiple 
outputs such as fuelwood, fruits and nuts, and forage and which also improve soil conditions, 
provide more immediate benefits to farm households than do single-purpose systems promoting 
long-term timber production [Murray, 1985; Hoskins, 1987; Hosier, 1989]. For example, Gregersen, 
Draper, and Elz [1989] conclude that, "farmers compare the expected net benefits [of tree 
cultivation] with the benefits they could obtain from using their land, resources and time in the next 
best use in the farming system." For this reason, and the oftentimes high fixed costs of establishment 
and high opportunity costs of land, multiple-purpose systems are often more highly competitive. 
The quality of land available also may significantly influence farmers' choices to dedicate 
land to long-term versus short-term tree cultivation. Agroforestry systems employing multiple-
purpose tree species have been adopted, for example, in Senegal and the Philippines where available 
land is productive and fertile, though scarce [Hyman, 1983b; Caveness and Kurtz, 1991]. 
, 
Conversely, when benefits are long-term, perceived value is low and market access is not secure, 
farmers tend to reforest less productive or marginal lands [Hyman, 1983a; Francis and Atta-Krah, 
1989]. Timber reforestation efforts in Costa Rica and Peru have been more successful when 
available land permits tree cultivation without the loss of currently productive agricultural lands 
[Thrupp, 1981; and FAD, 1988]. 
Long-term reforestation and timber production may still be the best possible use for a parcel 
-

of land if labor or capital constraints or other factors faced by the farmer preclude alternative 
investments which are economically viable. Additional non-econoinic benefits such as erosion 
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control, water conservation, improved soil fertility, and wind protection have also been cited as 
reasons for farmer tree cultivation [Scherr, 1992]. The diffusion of information through farmer 
interaction with agricultural extension and community organizations can also strongly affect 
adoption of technologies and agricultural practices as well as participation in farmer programs 
[Raintree, 1983; Romero Pastor, 1985; Smit and Smithers, 1992; Besley and Case, 1993; Arellanes, 
1994]. 
Explaining Reforestation Program Participation 
The analytical approach employed in this paper to identify the determinants of farmer participation 
in Costa Rica's reforestation programs draws from the previous literature on the economics of 
program participation. Prior analyses have commonly been applied to a variety of farm and resource 
management programs in the United States in which farmers' program participation is modeled 
econometrically as a function of a variety of economic, demographic, and farm system variables 
[Chambers and Foster, 1983; Lee and Boisvert, 1985; Rahm and Huffman, 1984]. The extension 
of this type of analysis to reforestation programs is straightforward as the latter also involves farmers' 
tradeoffs of net program benefits with the opportunity costs of participation. 
The decision to participate in the reforestation incentive program can be framed as a 
dichotomous choice model based on maximization of an underlying well-behaved utility function 
which is assumed to be consistent with individual farm household behavior. A farm household can 
be expected to allocate land, labor, and capital resources to reforestation efforts if that strategy yields 
­
the largest utility forthe household [Chambers and Foster, 1983; Rahrn and Huffman, 1984]. Based 
on previous research on farm program participation by Chambers and Foster [1983], Lee and 
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Boisvert [1985], and Boisvert, Bills, and Bailey [1988], the following utility function can be defined: 
where the parameter p denotes participation in the program of the ith individual, vector Z represents 
attributes attained from program participation which allow a comparison with competing land uses, 
and vector Xi denotes attributes of the individual, household, and farm system which are exogenous 
to the decision to participate. The vector V represents the unknown parameters associated with 
variables of vectors Z and X. The factors which ultimately influence a farmer's decision to 
participate in reforestation will be those that affect the farmer's perceptions of the economic and 
conservation value of reforestation versus the value of competing land uses. An individual farmer 
is assumed to participate in the reforestation incentive program if the utility attained from 
participation is larger than that which is attained from not participating: 
Participation: Di = 1 if Uio < Ui1 
The probability of program participation, Pr(D j=l), is a cumulative distribution function of F 
evaluated at XiP, where Xi is a vector of all explanatory variables and P is a vector of unknown 
parameters [Rahm and Huffman, 1984]. This cumulative distribution function is often modeled 
using the logistic distribution in empirical studies [Polson and Spencer, 1991]. The logistic 
cumulative distribution function is the basis for the logit regression model which has the following 
form: 
e 
Po+P'X.
' 
­
Probability of Participation = Prob(Yj =1) = ---- = P (1) .. 
R +R'X1+e t'o t' ; 
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The estimation form of the "logit" transformation of the probability of program participation, P(y=l), 
can be represented as: 
(2)
 
The logit transformation has desirable properties in that it is linear in its parameters, can be 
continuous, and may range from -00 to +00 depending on the scale of the independent variables. 
Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the parameters of those variables affecting the 
probability of participation in the reforestation incentive program. 
Factors related to the farm household, farming system, and information diffusion are 
hypothesized to influence the decision to participate in the reforestation incentive program. The 
literature on the adoption of technology, agroforestry, and commercial reforestation practices 
collectively identify a variety of spec~fic determinants: land tenure, farm size, farm income, 
household labor usage, farmer age, farmer experience and education, household size, and access to 
information and agricultural extension [Feder, Just, and Zilberman, 1982; Polson and Spencer, 1991; 
Rauniyar and Goode, 1992; Caveness and Kurtz, 1993]. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables hypothesized here to influence farmer participation in the 
reforestation incentive programs. Total farm size, the variable AREA, has been shown to be 
-
positively related to the adoption of tree cultivation [Chambers, Saxena, and Shah, 1989; Caveness 
and Kurtz, 1993]. Greater land availability is assumed to permit reforestation without the sacrifice 
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of agricultural production necessary to meet household food and income needs. 
The variable reflecting the possession of legal land title (TITLE) is hypothesized to be 
positively related to program participation. The form of tenure enjoyed by farmers surveyed in this 
study included both official title and "bill of sale." The possession of title affects participation in two 
ways. First, the more lucrative CAFa incentive requires legal title of participants. Second, the 
process of obtaining legal title may denote a level of experience in dealing with legal and 
government bureaucracies that may impart a willingness to participate in government programs. 
The influence of farmer age (variable AGE) on participation in the incentive program is 
unclear. Older farmers are often viewed as less flexible, more risk averse, and less willing to engage 
in a new or innovative activity. However, if reforestation is perceived as a way to decrease the scale 
and intensity of farm operations, it follows that farmers approaching retirement may be particularly 
interested in reforestation incentives because of the lower labor requirements and lower household 
needs [Dewees, 1992]. 
Tree cultivation is labor-intensive in the planting stage but is generally perceived to be less 
labor-intensive in the long-term than the cultivation of most crops. Farmers have widely cited a 
shortage of available household labor for crop production as a motivation for tree planting [Hyman, 
1983b; Dewees, 1992; Scherr, 1992]. Arnold [1987] and Godoy [1992] link reforestation with 
households where family labor has been allocated to off-farm employment which generates greater 
returns than would be possible from on-farm activities. Therefore, the variable representing the 
number of available work days of family labor per hectare (FAMLAB), is expected to be negatively 
-

associated with participation in the reforestation program. 
Complementing the above argument, the percent of household income from off-farm sources 
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(%NFARMINC) is hypothesized to be positively related to participation. When household income 
is derived principally off-farm and/or farm income is low, investment in low labor-intensity practices 
which are associated with lower farm capital requirements are favored. Thus, participation in the 
reforestation incentive program complements existing patterns of family labor allocation to off-farm 
activities and provides a use for land which cannot otherwise be exploited. As tree cultivation does 
not yield short-term benefits to the household, households with higher alternative sources of income 
should be more likely to participate in the reforestation effort [Arnold, 1992; Dewees, 1992]. 
Farmers with outstanding debts need short-term profits to make their monthly payments. At 
first glance, the long-term returns of reforestation would not seem compatible with debt servicing. 
However, the reforestation incentive programs examined here provide an immediate cash flow which 
can be employed to help service debt and, moreover, which may be obtained without any significant 
capital investment and largely through the self-employment of family labor. The ability to obtain 
credit may further denote a level of experience and interaction with the banking system which may 
predispose farmers to participation in government programs. For these reasons, the variable DEBT 
is hypothesized to be positively associated with participation in the incentive programs. 
The diffusion of information which has previously been shown to be an important 
determinant of technology and crop adoption and program participation [Raintree, 1983; Smit and 
Smithers, 1992; Besley and Case, 1993] is here incorporated in two ways. Visitation by an 
agricultural extensionist during the prior year (variable EXTENSION) indicates farmer interaction 
with existing information and education networks. It is assumed that the more integrated farmers 
­
are into these systems, the more likely they will be open to innovative practices such as reforestation, 
and thus, a positive association is expected between the EXTENSION variable and program 
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participation. Second, the degree to which farmers have sought out and obtained information about 
the reforestation incentive program should have a positive correlation to participation. The binary 
variable REFMEET represents whether a farmer attended a community-wide meeting, workshop ,or 
field day about the reforestation activity prior to enrolling in the incentive program, and is also 
expected to be positively associated with participation. 
Previous research suggests that farmers will choose first to reforest the more marginal lands 
within their farm system. Both of the land quality variables included here are thus assumed to 
exhibit a positive relationship with participation in the incentive programs. The variable 
%DEGRADED represents the percent of the farm system which the farmer reported to have "poor 
soil quality." Similarly, the variable %STEEP indicates the percent of the farm system which the 
farmer described as being "steeply sloped." 
In addition to the above variables, the availability of direct information on the profitability 
(discounted net benefits) of participation in the reforestation programs would be useful in 
understanding farmers' participation decisions. Unfortunately, consistent and comparable economic 
data applicable to southern Costa Rica are not readily available. A recent World Bank study (Kishor 
and Constantino, 1993) does examine the profitability (net present values (NPVs)) of several forest 
management options in Costa Rica -- forest "liquidation" (harvesting all wood of commercial value), 
managed natural forestry, plantation forestry, and cattle ranching -- under various price, tax, and 
subsidy scenarios. The study concludes that with low discount rates (5-10%), plantation forestry is 
by far the most profitable management option, with NPVs on the order of $3,200 per hectare (1989 
­
dollars) at an 8% discount rate. At the higher discount rates more appropriate to small landholders, 
however, NPVs decline sharply and alternative management options, particularly forest "liquidation" 
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and cattle ranching, become relatively more profitable. At a 20% discount rate, for example, an 
estimated NPV of $228 per hectare for plantation forestry makes it the least profitable of the four 
alternatives. With the introduction of reforestation subsidies, both managed forests and plantations 
become, predictably, more profitable, although at a discount rate of 20% and above, plantation 
forestry is again the least profitable alternative. 
Another recent study by Current (1995) evaluates selected agroforestry systems in Costa Rica 
(although not in the southern region of the country where the current study was conducted). This 
analysis finds that, at the same 20% discount rate, NPVs for two different woodlot (Gmelina 
arborea) and intercropping (coffee and Cedrela mexicana) systems range between $-77 and $222 
per hectare, and $-21 and $120 per hectare, respectively. With the adoption of subsidies, these 
systems become (more) profitable, but their adoption still has to contend with numerous sources of 
risk experienced and perceived by farmers --instability in log prices, management risk, lack of 
markets for woodlot thinnings, etc. -- which may decrease their attractiveness. 
These studies together suggest that economic evaluation of reforestation depends, to a 
considerable extent, on farmers' risk assessments and the rate at which they discount expected future 
net economic benefits from alternative farm and forest management strategies. Although expected 
economic profitability plays an important role in influencing the adoption of reforestation and 
agroforestry systems, as Current and Scherr (1995) conclude in their recent review, "profitability was 
not necessarily a good predictor of adoption" (p. 95). Further, while the levels of existing subsidies 
have the potential to tum non-profitable management strategies into profitable ones, this is not a 
-
, 
necessary or inevitable outcome. Kishor and Constantino (1993) conclude, for example, that 
subsidies would have to be increased more than 50% above current levels to make managed forestry 
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a viable management option for smallholders. These results provide further motivation for the 
importance of analyzing factors other than solely economic ones influencing reforestation program 
participation, especially the farm system variables enumerated above. 
Given the above hypothesized determinants of program participation, the general form of the 
reforestation incentive program participation equation is: 
In [P(REFOREST =1) / (1 - P(REFOREST =1))] = 
~o + ~IAREA + ~2TITLE +~3AGE + ~4EXTENSION + 
~5FAMLAB + ~6%NFARMINC + ~7DEBT + ~8REFMEET + 
~9FARMINC + ~IO%DEGRADED + ~II%STEEP + E j 
Survey Design and Sample Data 
The data used to estimate the above model were gathered from personal interviews with 243 farmers 
in the District of Coto Brus, Costa Rica, in June-August, 1994. The data collected refer to 
production decisions occurring in the February, 1993, to January, 1994, period (unless otherwise 
specified). A population of 114 reforestation program participants lived in the districts of Limoncito, 
San Vito-Pittier, and Sabalito, representing three percent of all farms in the region and 10% of farms 
with five hectares or more. A stratified random sample of 80 program participants was selected from 
this population. A sample of 163 farmers who were not program participants was drawn through 
randomized pairing of reforesters with non-reforesting neighbors who had ownership of at least five 
hectares of land. This group represented seven percent of all farms and 15% of farms of at least five 
hectares. Including only sample farms with five hectares or more was based on the empirical 
observation that smaller farms very infrequently engaged in reforestation efforts. The 1984 
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Agricultural Census shows that 44% of the farms in Coto Brus were at least five hectares and these 
accounted for 84% of the land area of the county. Within the sample of non-participants, 10 farmers 
were identified who were reforesting part of their land on their own, with no government incentives. 
These observations were deleted in estimating the program participation model. Using logistic 
regression yields unbiased and efficient coefficient estimates when choice-based sampling is 
employed, as was the case here [Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989]. In this case, the intercept parameter 
cannot be reliably interpreted. 
The sample data suggest several differences between the characteristics of reforestation 
program participants and those not participating (Table 2). Those reforesting were shown to have 
larger farm size and hold legal title to their land in a greater proportion than non-reforesters. 
Although program participants had higher mean household incomes, farm income per hectare is 
significantly lower than for non-participating farms indicating that program reforesters were typically 
dedicated to less profitable, land-extensive activities. A greater proportion of participants' household 
income was derived from off-farm sources and outstanding debt was more common. Although mean 
household sizes and age of head of household were similar across the two groups, the amount of 
family labor that was available for agricultural work was lower for the participant sample. Adjusted 
for farm size, the quantity of family labor provided per hectare was much higher for non-participants 
than for those participating in the reforestation programs. 
Program participants attained a slightly higher mean level of education than non-participants. 
Their level of interaction with agricultural extension and community organizations was significantly 
­
greater. Also confirming the importance of information diffusion, a greater proportion of 
participants had sought out information about the incentive program prior to their enrollment than 
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was evident for non-reforesters. 
The motivations farmers cited for participation in the reforestation program and the 
characteristics of land which had been converted to forest were also recorded. Table 3 presents the 
primary motives for enrollment in the incentive programs. Only 30% of reforesters cited the 
production of timber products as their primary motivation for participation. The most frequently 
cited reason (35% of reforesters) was concern about the effects of deforestation in damaging the local 
environment, particularly their farm (e.g., soil and water conservation). Another 30% mentioned 
compensation or atonement for past tree-cutting on their part as their primary motivation (this high 
response may in part reflect widespread environmental education efforts in Costa Rica). Only five 
percent of participants directly responded that cash incentives were the main factor behind their 
participation, although this figure is likely understated. 
Farmers' opportunity costs of reforestation are important and can be understood in part by 
identifying previous land uses and farmers' perceptions ofthe best alternative uses of reforested land. 
As evidenced by the statistics in Figure 1a, it is clear that primarily marginal, less productive lands 
have been reforested under the CAFa and FDF programs. Half of the reforested area was previously 
in fallow for a year prior to tree planting. The second most common prior land use was cattle pasture 
(31 % of reforested area). Coffee and basic grain production had been stopped in favor of tree 
planting on only 5% and 12%, respectively, of the reforested area. In terms of opportunity cost of 
the reforested land, farmers cited pasture as the best alternative use for 62% ofthis land (Figure 1b). 
Nineteen percent of the reforested area was deemed suited for basic grain production with only 12% 
-

suited for coffee production. 
Farmers' emphasis on reforestation of marginal lands is further confirmed by the fact that 
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farmers surveyed strongly preferred to reforest land with moderate to steep slopes (82% of the 
reforested area) rather than less steeply inclined cropland. A majority of the reforested area was 
perceived by farmers to have only poor to fair soil fertility. Only 18% of the reforested area was 
roughly level agricultural land which farmers also perceived to possess good soil fertility. 
Empirical Results 
The estimated results for the reforestation program participation model are presented in Table 4. The 
table also reports the "odds ratio" and change in probability associated with a given increase in each 
variable, and summary regression statistics. The odds ratio indicates the level of association between 
an explanatory factor and program participation. An odds ratio greater than one signifies that the 
likelihood of farmer participation in the reforestation incentive program increases with higher levels 
of the specified variable. 
Seven of the eleven logistic regression coefficients are significant at the IX =.10 level or 
higher. As hypothesized, farm size (AREA) exhibits a positive relationship to participation in the 
incentive programs. The coefficient of AREA is significant and its associated odds ratio of 1.19 
implies that a farmer with 10 additional hectares in farm size is about 20 percent more likely to 
participate in the reforestation programs. 
The coefficient of variable TITLE also is significant and demonstrates a positive relationship 
with participation. The odds ratio indicates that a farmer who holds a land title is more than three 
and a half times as likely to enroll in the incentive programs as one who does not. The experience 
-
with governmental bureaucracies gained from obtaining land title and the socio-economic status 
implied by title possession may favor program participation. Also, title permits one to receive 
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benefits from the more lucrative CAFa incentive program. 
The coefficient of the variable representing family labor available per hectare (FAMLAB) 
is significant at the five percent level and exhibits the hypothesized negative sign. The odds ratio 
of 0.76 reflects the fact that the farm household which is able or chooses to allocate one additional 
month (24 working days) of family labor to the farm operation is about 24 percent less likely to 
participate in the incentive programs. This provides some confirmation of the earlier hypothesis that 
program participants are likely to have limited family labor resources available for on-farm 
agricultural production and/or that they choose to allocate family labor to off-farm activities. 
The results regarding the estimated effects of non-farm income are also consistent with those 
pertaining to family labor allocation. The coefficient of %NFARMINC (representing percent of non­
farm income) is highly significant and positively related to program participation. A farm household 
with 10% greater non-farm income is almost 20% more likely to be enrolled in the reforestation 
incentive program. These programs may represent a means by which farm households can take 
advantage of relatively low labor availability by complementing their ability to pursue off-farm 
employment which is also often more highly remunerative. Tree-growing also generates other 
benefits for households, including low maintenance requirements, serving as a store of value to meet 
contingencies, and flexibility in harvest time and quantity [Chambers and Leach, 1990]. 
The coefficient ofthe variable DEBT is significant at the 10% level and displays the expected 
positive relationship to program enrollment. A farmer who has long-term outstanding debts has 90% 
greater odds of participating in the reforestation programs. These farmers are likely utilizing the 
-

incentive payments from the program at least in part for debt servicing. In addition, farmers who are 
able to obtain credit from the banking system are likely to have a level of knowledge and expertise 
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in financial management which may correlate with their willingness to participate in the reforestation 
programs. 
The coefficients of the extension variables both are significant and suggest strong influences 
on program participation. The coefficient of the EXTENSION variable has the expected positive 
sign and its associated odds ratio of 2.28 implies that farmers are over twice as likely to join the 
reforestation programs if they had previously received government technical assistance for other 
agricultural activities prior to enrollment. The coefficient ofREFMEET is also positively signed and 
indicates that a farmer who attended a workshop or field day to obtain information about the 
reforestation program prior to enrollment was four and a half times more likely to participate. 
The coefficients of the last three variables in the model presented in Table 4 -- farm income 
(FARMINC), land quality (%DEGRADED), and land slope (%STEEP) -- exhibit the expected 
relationships with program participation. However, they are not statistically significant and thus 
inferences as to the nature of their impacts on participation cannot be strictly made. 
Table 4 also presents three statistics which assess the goodness-of-fit of the model. The 
likelihood ratio test statistic of 78.65 is significant at the one percent level, indicating that the 
estimated model is significantly different than the model where all coefficients are set equal to zero. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic is used to compare the probability of participation for each 
individual generated by the specified model and by the "saturated" model employing the observed 
data. The H-L statistic of 12.94 compared to a Chi-square distribution with 8 degrees of freedom 
yields a p-value =.114, suggesting a relatively good fit. Finally, the estimated model correctly 
­
classifies 80% of the observations in the sample. 
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Conclusions 
The findings of this analysis show that factors regarding farm system characteristics, household 
livelihood strategies, and access to infonnation are significant in explaining farmer participation in 
Costa Rica's reforestation incentive programs. The reforesters participating in the program generally 
had larger farm sizes dedicated to low labor-intensive, land-extensive agricultural activities, 
compared to their non-participating neighbors. The majority of land converted to tree cultivation 
was less productive and of marginal quality. The household livelihood strategies of reforesters 
depended to a greater degree on off-farm income sources, as a consequence of having less family 
labor available for on-farm agricultural work. Interaction with the local agricultural extension 
network and attendance at workshops or field demonstrations on reforestation had strong effects in 
increasing enrollment in the reforestation program. 
The principal conclusion inferred from these findings is that farmers may perceive 
participation in the reforestation incentive programs as taking advantage of a government-sponsored 
set-aside of marginal, unproductive land for conservation purposes. Reforestation appears not to be 
viewed by farmers primarily as the adoption of a long-tenn economic production objective. Rather, 
farmers seem to be primarily motivated by alternative short-tenn economic and non-economic 
benefits which the household derives through participation in the incentive programs. 
The decision to participate in the incentive programs appears to be part of a farmer's two-fold 
strategy. First, in the short-run, farmers can derive financial benefits from lands which are not 
otherwise suitable for crop or cattle production, due to land quality or capital and labor constraints. 
-
Farmers cited improving soil moisture content, and conservation of soil and water as benefits 
, . 
associated with reforestation. In addition to providing supplementary cash income, the long-tenn 
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timber harvest is commonly viewed as a "savings account" for the next generation. Moreover, 84 
percent of the reforesters also expected their land values to appreciate as a result of reforestation. 
Second, reforestation is a land use option which complements a diminished role of the farm 
operation within the household livelihood strategy. For households participating in the program, the 
farm operation is not yielding income comparable to farms of similar size, in large part due to family 
labor constraints which limit on-farm income-generating activities. Alternatively, when household 
labor can be more profitably allocated to off-farm activities, the low labor demands of reforestation 
are additionally attractive. 
One of the clear conclusions of this research is that most farmers participating in the CAFa 
and PDF programs appear not to be generally pursuing the goal of high quality timber production. 
The majority of farmers do intend to harvest timber eventually, however, most prefer to make 
minimal investments in the long-term management of the trees. Many farmers view plantation 
reforestation akin to natural forest growth and expect a viable harvest to naturally result over the long 
term. 
Given their documented reasons for participating in the reforestation programs, it is perhaps 
not surprising that these programs have been criticized for their poor record of long-term 
management and quality control of reforested plots. A 1993 external audit of the Forestry 
Development Program [Martinez et al., 1994) determined that only 17% of reforested stands were 
actually capable of producing quality timber; 21 percent of the plots were deemed a complete loss. 
Immediate intervention was needed in 62% of the reforested plots if the trees were to survive long­
­
term. The timber quality problem may reflect the fact that farmers are fundamentally motivated by 
economic and non-economic benefits which complement a shift in the household livelihood strategy, 
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rather than the long-term economic benefits of a high quality timber harvest. The results reported 
here suggest that reforestation programs in southeastern Costa Rica could be made more efficient 
by targeting households which share the characteristics identified in this analysis; that is, larger farms 
with a high proportion of steep, low quality land which also face significant labor and capital 
constraints, employ a high proportion of family labor off-farm, are used to dealing with extension 
and NGO programs, and possess land title but also face high debt loads. In other regions of Costa 
Rica -- or in other countries having similar programs -- surveys and empirical analyses comparable 
to those discussed here, and undertaken earlier in program development, could be similarly employed 
to help in the efficient targeting of reforestation and other resource management programs to achieve 
desired policy goals. 
Aside from the increased efficiencies in targeting potential participants, quality management 
is vitally important if the growing domestic demand for wood products and other societal goals is 
to be satisfied through reforestation efforts. Although trees unquestionably serve many functions 
for the farm household [Chambers and Leach 1990], the long-term nature of the primary benefits 
farmers realize from reforestation suggests the importance of integrating cropping alternatives into 
agroforestry systems which provide multiple, including short-term, benefits. The importance of 
encouraging improved forestry management within the context of farm diversification strategies 
which jointly increase agricultural and forestry productivity was also emphasized in a recent CATIE­
IFPRI-World Bank review of agroforestry projects in Central America (Current and Scherr, 1995). 
Efforts to design low labor- and capital-intensive management practices which conform to farmers' 
underlying motivations for reforestation would also appear to be particularly important. Policy 
changes ranging from enhancing land and tree tenure to increasing· research efforts devoted to 
improving forest management practices would help make reforestation and agroforestry systems 
24 
more viable over the long-run. Additional policy improvements should take advantage of the proven 
value of information networks and extension programs and their ability to deliver information to 
farmers, and, in the case of reforestation programs themselves, to enhance the quality and breadth 
of program participation through improved targeting strategies. If encouraging farmers' aggregate 
crop and forest productivity is a desired policy goal, other policy strategies which take advantage of 
the complementarities of crop and tree-planting should also be given close attention. 
-
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Table 1. Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs for Participation Analysis 
Variable 
AREA 
TITLE 
AGE 
FAMLAB 
%NFARMINC 
FARMINC 
DEBT 
EXTENSION 
REFMEET 
%DEGRADED 
%STEEP 
Description
 
Farm system size in hectares.
 
Farmer possesses legal land title to at least part
 
of farm system: 1 = yes; 0 = no
 
Farmer age in years.
 
Family on-farm labor days available per hectare.
 
Percent of household income earned from off­

farm sources.
 
Total farm operation net income.
 
Farmer has one year or more of outstanding debt 
liabilities: I =yes; 0 =no 
Farmer was visited in past year by agricultural 
extensionist: 1 =yes; 0 =no 
Farmer attended workshop or field day about 
reforestation (prior to enrollment in program): 
1 =yes; 0 =no 
Percent of farm system with degraded soil as 
perceived by farmer. 
Percent of farm system with steep slopes as 
perceived by farmer. 
Expected Sign 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
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Table 2. Mean Comparisons of Sample Non-reforesters and Reforesters 
Non-Reforesters Program Reforesters 
Variable (n =135) (n =80) 
Total Farm Size 17.89 has. 43.34 has. 
% Farmers Possessing Legal Land 69% 88%
 
Titleb
 
Non-Farm Income as % of Household 18% 33%
 
Incomeb 
% Farmers Possessing Long-Term 25% 44% 
Debtb 
Family On-Farm Laborersa 1.82 1.38 
Family On-Farm Labor DayslHaIY~ 52 27 
Household Size 5.05 5.24 
Farmer Age 47.00 years 48.73 years 
Farmer Educationa 4.16 years 5.09 years 
Farmers Visited by Agric. Extension in 19% 34% 
Past Yearb 
Community Development Meetings 5.12 8.75 
Attended by Farmer in Past Ye~ 
% of Farmers Attending Reforestation 9% 36% 
Workshop Prior to Enrollmentb 
-

a Difference significant for two-sample t-test at ex. = .05.
 
b Difference significant for z-test of binomial proportions at ex. =.05.
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Table 3. Primary Motives Cited for Participation in the Reforestation Programs 
(1) Obtain cash incentives 5% 
(2) Produce timber products 30% 
(3) Conserve water and soil 35% 
(4) Compensate for past deforestation on their part 30% 
Primary Motivation % of Program Reforesters 
-
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates, Odds Ratios, Changes in Probability and G~odness 
of Fit Measures for the Reforestation Incentive Program Participation Model 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -3.3932a 
AREAl 0.0173b 
TITLE3 1.2648a 
AGEl 0.0139 
EXTENSION3 0.8249b 
FAMLAB2 -0.0112b 
%NFARMINC I 0.0163a 
DEBT3 0.640SC 
REFMEET3 1.5129a 
FARMINC I -0.0048 
%DEGRADED I 0.005 
%STEEpl 0.0013 
Likelihood Ratio 78.6Y 
Test (G) 
Hosemer­ 12.94 (p=.114) 
Lemeshow Test 
# Correct 186 (80%) 
Predictions 
I Odds ratio and change in probability are for a 10 unit increase in x 
2 Odds ratio and change in probability are for a 24 unit increase in x 
3 Odds ratio and change in probability are for a 1 unit increase in x 
• Indicates significance at a = .01 
b Indicates significance at a = .05 
C Indicates significance at a = .10 
Change in 
t-Ratio Odds Ratio Probability 
-3.769 
2.073 
2.674 
1.014 
2.07 
2.014 
2.902 
1.758 
3.637 
-1.181 
0.784 
0.194 
1.19 0.0303 
3.54 0.1499 
1.15 0.0244 
2.28 0.0821 
0.76 -0.0472 
1.18 0.0285 
1.9 0.056 
4.54 0.1962 
0.95 -0.0084 
1.05 0.0088 
1.01 0.0023 
-
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Fig.1 a. Previous Use of Reforested Plots 
Percent 
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Fig.1 b. Best Alternative Use of Plots 
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